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Introduction 
 
Soft budget constraints (SBC) mean such conditions of the firm performance, 
interaction with rivals and partners under which firm’s survival doesn’t depend on 
efficiency of resources utilization. J.Kornai  was the first one who has introduced 
SBC notion  especially for centrally planned economies. It was revealed, however, 
that dynamics of SBC demonstrated weak dependency on government ideology and 
economic policy as it might be seen at first glance. It means that SBC has deeper 
raison d’etre. The problem to be resolved is the following: whether these phenomena 
are consequences of only political (subjective) reasons or it is conditioned by the 
general economic and organizational factors which determine current political 
decisions of federal and regional authorities massively bailing-out enterprises with 
financial losses and without necessary restructuring. This point is important to seek 
for  answers on basic questions of political economy of reforms: its scope, speed, 
irreversibility, compensations from winners to losers and credibility of commitments 
on compensations. 
 
Generalization of three basic models (Dewatripont-Maskin, Che and Mitchell), 
explaining SBC emergence and persistence in transitory and market economies is 
suggested. The basic idea is following: default of liabilities within short (simple) 
contract forgiving by suffered party is only the moment of wider contract 
implementation. Latter contract is more complex and long-term. Conditions of wider 
contract envisage reneging from terms of partial “sub-contracts” which might be 
compensated by future transactions involving interested parties as an implementation 
of embracing contract. For testing of hypothesis on SBC answers of Russian 
enterprises managers (Russian Economic Barometer panel) have been analyzed. 
Available data support the contractual model of SBC.   
 
Section 1 is devoted to discussions of the available theoretical SBC models with 
some political implications, Section 2 gives a generalized definition of soft budget 
constraints in the context of the New Institutional Economics approach based on 
ideas of institutional market and more narrowly – political market. The SBC are 
interpreted as a relational contract concluded by agents under weak competitive 
environment when it’s infringement in some cases are economically sound as against 
to break the long-term contract or apply sanction to a violator.  Following from this 
theoretical model the hypotheses are formulated and tested in the Section 3. And last 
but not least, some mostly important conclusions on political perspectives of SBC 
future are suggested. 
 
 
 
1. The Phenomenon of Soft Budget Constraints and it’s Explanation 
 
The concept of “soft budget constraints” (SBC) was introduced by J. Kornai over 20 
years ago [Kornai, 1980]. In the initial definition he interpreted SBC as recurrent 
actions of subjects, peculiar rules of behavior. 
Explicit formulation of this phenomenon as a set of behavioral rules  for enterprises, 
the state in the  person of the authorities, credit institutions and foreign investors 
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under the centrally planned economy may be treated as: to go on financing 
enterprise’s activity even in the cases when it violates the fixed parameters of budget 
and if these violations may be referred to desire (intention) to increase production 
output.  
This rule was logically revealed on the base of observed behavioral actions of the 
mentioned subjects, and it’s of course informal by nature.1  
It should be emphasized that under such conditions every agent was guided by 
“common” criteria of economic rationality acting as not to be subjected to informal 
(but on occasion to formal, for example, removal from the current position) 
sanctions from one of the parties for efforts to tighten budget constraints. Adherence 
to the SBC rules was encouraged in the different forms – from the premiums for 
disbursement of financial resources for investing to awards in promoting to new 
appointments. In other words, institutional environment, political constraints were in 
favor of SBC as existing everywhere phenomenon.  
So the initial SBC definition by J.Kornai denotes one of the centrally planned 
economy institutions and has uneconomic (unless – ant economic) character. 
Nevertheless, it didn’t hinder the subjects to make rational decisions, but under 
irrational constraints. As analysis implemented in his book “Deficit” has shown the 
aim to “ideological” perfection was the base of growing deficit accompanied by 
ineffective allocation of resources that in it’s turn led to collapse of socialist 
economy. In terms of Economics of ideology consequences of SBC were price  
which has been paid for adherence of particular ideological principles. 
Meanwhile, the literature survey of the last years shows that the issues of SBC are 
not subject the economic history only because this phenomenon is also widely 
spread in the market economy. For instance, in the number of countries the state 
supported major state-owned enterprises in the case of their insolvency [Maskin and 
Xu, 1999]; that the Asian crises of 1998 was interpreted as the consequence of SBC 
[Huang, Xu, 1999]; besides the prevalence of non-money settlements with negative 
impact on economic growth in the Russian transition economy was interpreted as 
well by SBC [Pinto, Drebentsov, Morozov, 2000], and so on.  
The number of in-depth studies was carried out in the arena of SBC consequences 
research. So, from the point of SBC existence there were suggested explanations of 
firms’ boundaries impact on efficiency of R&D [Huang and Xu, 1998]; it was shown 
that SBC may appear owing to centralization of capital thereby adversely 
influencing selection of commercial projects [Bai and Wang, 1998]; it was 
demonstrated that under SBC information generated by free market aggravates 
decision-making process [Faure-Grimaud, 1996]; it was grounded negative impact 
of SBC on innovation processes [Quian and Xu, 1998] and etc. (see review of 
studies in [Maskin and Xu, 1999]). 
Insofar ideological grounds for SBC existence under the centrally planned economy 
in all the above-mentioned cases were excluded then there have been set a task to 
explain SBC proceeding from other grounds. At the same time there are questions: 
do political reasons contribute to persistence of SBC in market and emerging market 
economies?; how political constraints influence on characteristics of budget 
constraints?. 
                                                 
1 The official documents of the centrally planned economy period are full of slogans for strengthening 
financial discipline, overcoming “diffusion of investments” and etc.  
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The preliminary condition for explanation of the situation when the sufferers 
condone violations of some liabilities to violators is more precise definition of SBC 
in the terms of neoclassical economic theory. The fact is that the initial institutional 
definition of the SBC given by J. Kornai doesn’t to be in harmony with the 
theoretical paradigm of the mainstream economics [Ambrus-Lakatos, 1997, p.2]. 
Besides that if SBC exert negative influence on creation of value then their tightness 
is a common normative recommendation. Under such circumstances the questions of 
what SBC are, what is the cause of their appearance, what is the consequence and 
what is the form of manifestation. Appropriate recommendations will explicitly 
depend upon the answers on these questions. Ignoring of details leads to 
oversimplifications as regards conclusions and recommendations. In its turn 
oversimplifications means underestimation of transformation cost, in particular, and 
cost of reform, in general. 
From this point of view we’ll consider the main wording in the SBC definition. 
Primarily SBC should be interpreted in the context of the problem financial 
commitment credibility: financial commitments reflect inability of a rational actor to 
protect original budget against alterations approved as a result of re-negotiations 
after it’s passed [Maskin and Xu, 1999, р.3]. The similar approach was realized 
under consideration and modeling the another phenomenon intrinsic in central 
planning – ratchet effect [Freixas, Gusnerie and Tirole, 1985]. As it’s known the 
essence of the last consists in that the planner isn’t able to credibly promise not to 
increase the plan output if he’s well aware of the real enterprise potential. For this 
reason enterprises enjoy incentives to conceal and distort information for the purpose 
of capacity understatement that in the end leads to squandering resources [Milgrom, 
Roberts, 1992, pp. 233-236].  
Such characteristic of the SBC phenomenon originally fixed in the form of verbal 
description of institution solved the problem associated with its inclusion in the 
modern economic theory though the definition of SBC isn’t formulated yet. To 
explain SBC from this point of view implies to give an answer on the question what 
are the reasons of such inability.  
L. Ambrus-Lakatos put forward a proposition to interpret SBC as a firm’s ability to 
survive despite significant and regular losses [Ambrus-Lakatos, 1997, p.6]. In other 
words if a firm is involved in transactions and it is able, bearing significant and/or 
regular losses, to make environment act in its favor, i.e. environment (various types 
of actors with special interests) doesn’t want or cannot liquidate it then it might be 
said that this firm is surviving. Thereby the SBC problem comes to the answer on 
the question: Why don’t the firm-partners having claims interfere in its activity, 
strive to meet claims through liquidation of this firm or its sale? The general answer 
on this question is apparent: they both (1) cannot, or (2) don’t want to meet claims.  
If the first situation is in place then it means that “injured” party is only in power to 
voluntarily reconcile conditions on base thereof it cooperate with the firm (despite 
default), and cooperation itself is business commercial relations by nature, i.e. 
bargaining transaction by J. Commons [Commons J.R., 1931, 1950]. To explain 
SBC in this case means to give an answer on the question why does the “suffered” 
party refrain from actions, which might be launched by the third party, on forcing to 
pay liabilities? 
If the second situation is in place then it means that “suffered” party is in power to 
enforce the firm to meet its commitments, and cooperation between them is of 
partial submission, i.e. management transaction by J. Commons. To explain SBC in 
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this case means to answer on the question why does the “suffered” party refrain from 
actions on forcing to pay commitments, i.e. to legally employ violation capacity.  
For the purposes of L. Ambrus-Lakatos explanations in both cases are founded on 
firm’s management behavior in particular circumstances named entrenchment 
[Shleifer, Vishny, 1988]. 
The most well-known interpretation of the SBC phenomenon is a model of M. 
Dewatripont and E. Maskin (hereinafter – DM model), which treats the SBC phenomenon 
as a consequence of financing centralization inasmuch only in the frameworks of 
decentralized crediting financial commitments are made from the side of the banking 
system not to credit “slow” (ineffective) projects [Dewatripont, Maskin, 1995]. 
DM model interpreted SBC appearance through credit centralization (broader – any 
resource of crediting firms) is related to the second type of SBC interpretations 
indicating the reasons why are defaults seldom condoned. Such explanation is in 
compliance with J. Kornai opinion consisted in that there is a likelihood of ex post 
negotiation on subsidies, taxes, credits and the like [Kornai, 1998]. This model also 
expresses the idea that the SBC phenomenon springs up because of planner’s 
inability in the frameworks of the centralized system to truthfully promise not to 
interfere with firm’s activity since the plans are approved. The model reveals the 
reason of such inability – the centralized system of financing itself.  
In the light of the above-said we’ll show the other description of the situation 
considered within DM model. Referred the above we mention the conception of 
cooperation between the centralized facilities and entrepreneur as a game. Let a bank 
examines two strategies – to finance the project (F) or not to finance (NF) on the one 
hand, and the entrepreneur on the other hand who can offer the bank to finance the 
“fast” project (F) given a probability p or the “slow” one (S) with a probability (1-p) 
(see Figure 1).  
The pay-off matrix of the first variant of this game is a DM model simplification 
means that in the case of financing the “fast” project throughout one year the 
entrepreneur will gain a benefit Ec while the bank a benefit equaled to 1. In the case 
when the project is “slow” one the benefits are equaled to 2Ec and 0, respectively, 
insofar the revenue derived from the “slow” project only compensate the bank costs 
(here we disengage from the discount issues of costs and revenues).  
Variant 1   
                   Bank 
  F NF 
Entrepreneur  F (р) Ес ; 1 0 ; 0 
 S (1 – р) 2 Ес ; 0 0; 0 
 
 
Variant 2 
                   Bank 
  F NF 
Entrepreneur F (р) Ес ; 1 0 ; 0 
 S (1 – р) 2 Ес ; -1 0; 0 
 
Figure. 1. Variants of cooperation between bank and entrepreneur.  
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If the bank opts for a strategy F its expected average payoff for two periods will be 
equaled to 1×р + 0×(1 – р) = p otherwise (in the case of the strategy NF) the payoff 
will be 0. Apparently if in the above situation there is at least one “fast” project it 
will be credited, i.e. p > 0, the bank will always make a decision about crediting 
entrepreneur.  
In the case of the “slow” project the bank’s payoff will be –1 (the second variant), 
i.e. the bank bears net loss and expected average pay-off of the F-strategy 1×р + (-
1)×(1 – р) = 2р – 1, that excesses 0 (guaranteed pay-off in the case of NF-strategy) 
only if p > 0,5. Obviously if the loss of the bank will be over modulus 2, the bank 
will never adhere to the F-strategy so p cannot excess 1.  
So far our analysis in essence coincide with Dewatripont and Maskin one. Exactly as 
we fix a probability p, which isn’t known to the bank, that the project will be “fast” 
(profitable). However the further course of reasoning may be fancied differently in 
respect to the considered model.  
As it’s imagined the other line of reasoning may be constructed proceeding from 
whether the bank has a possibility not to play in the described game, where there are 
so many unknown variables. If there is such a possibility (for example, along with 
financing the proposed projects the bank may enter the currency market where the 
required information for making relevant decisions is available) then under unknown 
p it will be more reasonable not to credit the entrepreneur’s projects at all.2 It should 
be stressed that the given bank’s behavior is independent whether there is one bank 
in the economy (centralized financing) or some thereof (decentralized financing). 
It’s only important that a bank face the participation constraint on dealing with such 
entrepreneur.  
If the bank – one or some of them – has no alternative ways to invest available 
resources except investing in projects of inadequate quality then in the decentralized 
situation action series appear mentioned by Dewatripont and Maskin (monitoring 
and the like), in the decentralized one there is crediting investment projects cause 
there are no other ways to use bank resources.  
So SBC springs up in the DM model for the reason that bank has no other ways to 
use resources except investing them in submitted projects rather than crediting is 
centralized.  
But if some banks have no other possibilities except investment ones then their 
behavior won’t be distinguishable from monopoly state-owned bank behavior 
exclusive of resources earmarked for monitoring with the purpose of estimation 
probability p for different types of the projects, revealing observable features typical 
for “fast” projects and the like, while a share of entrepreneurs’ funds will be spent on 
signaling to banks about high profitability of their projects.  
In other words the reason of SBC appearance primarily relates not to centralized 
financing but unavailability of other alternative ways to command banks’ funds. It’s 
not difficult to note that such situation is typical for the centrally planned economy 
irrespective of quantity of banks: they are to perform their function not having a 
chance to mobilize resources at their disposal in different spheres (particularly, in the 
exchange market).  
                                                 
2 As it’s seen namely this phenomenon has been observable in the Russian economy throughout 
nineties.   
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Admitted advantages of the decentralized system in regard to crediting enterprises as 
a vehicle to provide for high efficiency of used resources via enhancement of 
reliability of promises in relation to penalize violators were challenged by J. Che 
[Che, 2000]. 
The core of his model may be presented as follows. The are two types of enterprises 
in the economy: “good” (profitable) and “bad” (unprofitable). The latter divides into 
two subclasses: “frankly bad” those not to be able to operate without loss for one or 
the other reason (for instance, technological ones), and “opportunistic” those having 
a chance to be lucrative after restructuring implementation (this incurs certain costs 
from their side), however they are remained of their own opinion – not to transform 
the working process. If all these classes are quite comparable within the number of 
enterprises and their shares then the similar structure may be reputed as 
characteristic for many countries with economy in transition and this premise is 
important for the further discussions.  
Imagine that there is a sole bank centrally crediting all the enterprises. Its 
performance with profitable banks doesn’t bear any distinguished feature as 
compared with conditions in the decentralized system unlike cooperation with 
“frankly bad” and “opportunistic” enterprises. The author proves that in the given 
conditions the bank has to credit such enterprises, in other words to provide them for 
SBC, otherwise macroeconomic stability will be unbalanced, and it may do it so 
inasmuch owing its size the bank can internalize pecuniary externality arising as a 
result of activities produced by array of all the enterprises during supporting 
stability. Although such bank behavior undermines incentives associated with 
enhancement of efficiency of every enterprise, first of all “opportunistic” ones, it 
keeps these incentives for “good” firms, which would lose them under instability 
circumstances.  
Creation of completely decentralized financial system in economy similar to 
described one will lead the situation when the “bad” enterprises will be liquidated 
thereby engendered macroeconomic as well as social-political instability taking the 
shape of economic collapse. In fact, continuation of “bad” enterprises financing is 
the price of macroeconomic stability as a precondition of widening of temporal 
horizon of decision-making which requires strong political power3. 
The key premise of the model leading to these conclusions is assumption that 
productive capacities of every enterprise (during the timeframe considered in the 
model) are strictly limited and cannot be expanded. Otherwise there will be a chance 
to allot resources in favor of “good” enterprises allowing maintenance 
macroeconomic stability having simultaneously liquidated unprofitable enterprises.4  
With an allowance for these provisions common type of dependency, which should 
be between levels of domination on market and SBC in the case when the above-
mentioned conclusions are correct, may be presented as follows: the weaker 
competition which a firm realizes in the market of its product the higher probability 
of its domination and thereby the wider its potential to cover own financial 
                                                 
3 There is interesting observation of negative correlation between strength of executinve authorities 
and progress of reforms [Roland J., 2001, p.22] 
4 In the light of this it should be stressed that market entry and exit barriers are crucial when the 
conclusions of this model are applied to the real economy. As it’s well-known in Russia the both types 
of barriers are wide so the given prerequisite isn’t an impediment under its use to the explanation of 
domestic economy dynamics.  
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commitments at the expense of holding up prices for its product line. Besides that 
market competitive capacity may be appeared in other forms softening its budget 
constraints: primarily tractability of the partners in the context of sanction non-
application against such a firm, great impact on local authorities in respect to 
granting different forms of privileges and the like. Thus, soft-budget constraints 
under weakly competitive environment is closely related to strong incentives for 
rent-seeking behavior of managers. And as its consequence – capture of the state. 
That is why weak competitive environment creates additional costs for hardening of 
budget constraints under process of transformation of the economic system as a 
whole and restructuring of particular enterprises. That is why one of most popular 
articles of the federal law “On competition and deterrence of monopolistic activity 
on commodity markets” in the sense of implementation is article number 7 devoted 
to the problem of combination of economic activity and functions of executive 
power.  
 
2. Soft Budget Constraints as a Relational Contract 
 
If we generalize the above interpretations then it might be noted that they are 
reduced to the one: SBC are the mode of behavior of actors cooperating within 
explicit or implicit contract when non-redeeming of promises from the one party 
doesn’t bring about sanction from the other party; on the contrary the latter party 
carry on to collaborate with violator, furnishing resources not payable on demand. 
Let’s consider this generalized definition of the SBC in details.  
It should primarily paid attention to the fact that such way of behavior is of frequent 
occurrence among majority of private contractors not being centralized facilities of 
crediting for enterprises. For instance, a number of subsidies are in the Russian 
economy are granted not only from (1) federal and regional authorities (2) 
monopolies such as RAO EES (State Electricity Utilities Company) or Gazprom but 
also from (3) firms-contractors and (4) own employees resigning to wage loopholes 
as well [Pinto, Drebentsov, Morozov, 2000]. 
If the resources of crediting such as are reminiscences the centralized facilities, debt 
writing-off from the side of the third credit resource may be partly interpreted that 
they serve de facto as a link (transfer channel) of centralized subsidies [Vyplosh, 
Ivanova, 1998, p.8-9], while the grounds for such behavior from the forth crediting 
resource are not to be explained by the factor of centralization. Proceeding from DM 
model anyone can expect that an enterprises itself being a centralized financial 
resource for own employees will soft budget constraints for them however in 
practice the reverse is the case.  
Hence the factor of centralization serving as the basis  for SBC both in 
microeconomic DM model and macroeconomic model by J. Che is an attendant 
feature of others deepen reasons for condoning inappropriate behavior of one party 
by the other within contractual relations.  
Generally the reasons why contracts aren’t stern enforced to be perform are 
considered in economic theory of contracts [Williamson, 1975], [Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian, 1978], [Grout, 1984]. From this point stringent enforcement provides 
of contract performance encourages sellers (producers) to make investment in 
specific assets within the contract. In question if producer isn’t sure that order 
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requiring extra resources, which might be assigned for others products, will be paid 
then producer is keen to minimize this kind of costs unless repudiation to pay extra 
costs is in place. As a result this output may be produced if it isn’t paid in advance.  
Nevertheless, potential of  contracts enforcement is constrained by its imperfection 
(incompleteness). Incompleteness of the contracts may be distributed into four 
reasons. Firstly, costs of imperfect language when sense comprised in the contract is 
distorted and assumes different interpretations. Secondly, prohibitively high costs of 
making a complete contract connected with high costs of search needed information 
and bounded rationality of contracting subjects. Thirdly, it’s too costly to identify 
terms of contract in court or another authority. In particular if one of the parties must 
spare no efforts to perform a contract and this is stipulated in it then this term isn’t to 
be seen except this part itself. As a result there is no force to perform this term. 
Fourthly, the party can deliberately conclude incomplete contracts. In doing so they 
expect that consequences of such incompleteness won’t seriously harm them. 
Grounds for such expectations are primarily rested upon a possibility to revise a 
contract, i.e. in fact signing of relational rather than classical or neoclassical 
contracts [Williamson, 1985]. 
Owing to the above-mentioned reasons one can assert that weak enforcement of 
contract performance isn’t exception quite the contrary it’s a common manifestation. 
Accordingly SBC of a firm are typical as well and legal action in respect to contract 
breaker is exception to the rule.  
De facto in the frameworks of the Civil Law delay in payments within three months 
is allowed. Data confirms that turnover of inter-firms overdue non-payments in the 
countries with emerging markets are compareable with analogous figures in the 
countries with free markets [Schaffer, 1998]. In other words existence of really soft 
budget constraints may be only testified by the fact of condoning violation of 
contract terms out of the bounds of delay related to their performance under the law.  
Another conclusion of expounded contract treatment should be mentioned as well: 
bail-out of one contract violation may be regarded as a decision made within 
proceeding implementation of the overall and long-term contract covering the 
broken one (in fact neoclassical) contract. In other words the fact itself that the 
“suffered” party hasn’t recourse to the law and goes on to cooperate to the violator 
means instead of external state controlling a contract the “suffered” party puts in 
operation internal mechanism of such governance identical to the nature of relational 
contracts.  
Additionally, this kind of institutional arrangements might be considered as a 
consequence of particular features of institutional environment both on federal and on 
regional levels.  
Insofar such relational contract characterizing long-term inter-firm relations is in 
nature of informal or implicit one its precise performance may be regarded on the 
part of neutral observer as a “unexplainable” bail-out sporadic violations of 
contractual terms by the “suffered” party. Thereby realizing the nature of SBC on 
the base of observance for occasional contracts are thought limited. 
 
Others arguments in favor of relational nature of those contracts where bail-outs 
some obligations by the “suffered” party is a common case are brought by another 
phenomenon as industrial network.  
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As a matter of fact cooperation of enterprises inside of industrial network 
conditioned by recurrent cooperation of its members gives all the grounds to 
interpret occasional violations of terms as certain rules of game where the current 
losses are compensated at the expense of future interactions [Powell, 1990]. If these 
violations are systemic and not compensated then breaker isn’t only removed from 
network (informal sanction) but made be a bankrupt as well. At the same time 
during period of network membership it’s easy to see that budget constraints are 
soft. Inasmuch concept of industrial network doesn’t assume existence of the central 
element regulating behavior of the other members of this informal organization 
[Forsgren at al., 1995] then SBC phenomenon is in place though the central source 
of crediting is absent.  
 
In particular, it was above-mentioned the study expounding that SBC adversely 
influence innovational activity of enterprises [Quian and Xu, 1998] so it’s expected 
deterioration of innovational process quality. However, in accordance with an 
alternative theory business-groups can be served as organization facilitating 
modernization processes when access to the financial market is limited [Kali, 2000]. 
Moreover, this concept is justified for empirical data inherent for economies in 
transition.  
 
In connection with discussions and grounds of contractual nature of SBC attention 
should be drawn to one moment, namely, the nature of subjects of such a contract. 
Besides existence of this phenomenon in relations between firms all-round and 
permanent formal violation (and bailing-out of such violations) of budget constraints 
happens inside of a firm as well the  structure of which includes centers of costs and 
centers of profits.  
 
It’s important to emphasize for example that both centers of costs and centers of 
profits inside of holding structure may be incorporated. In this case the formers if we 
consider as incorporated enterprises (firms) will enjoy SBC bearing (because of 
certain intra-holding transfer prices) long-dated losses compensated by subsidies 
from either head company or centers of profit.  
 
Important for our discussion the fact that incorporated centers of profit and costs one 
of them are formally ineffective “legal” firms positively influence use of resources 
and value creation within comprehensive firm on the whole. Thereby realization of 
requirements to harden budget constraints for formally independent enterprises, in 
essence acting as centers of costs in one formal or informal “big” firm will come to 
negative economic outcomes from the point of value creation.  
 
Following strict logical definition of SBC as specific relational contract its subjects 
are to be “real” or economic firms rather than firms – legal entities. Along with this 
such precise definition of SBC can make it non-operationalized. In question to 
determine the bounds of the firm is difficult theoretical (as well as practical) task. 
Distinguished features are appeared when mentioned phenomenon of industrial 
network, co-existence and over-lapping of formal and informal business-groups are 
introduced.  
 
As it’s seen the definition of economic firm may be operationalized on the base of 
contract approach. In effect nowadays that’s publicly admitted that any (voluntarily 
established) organization has a contract nature: its grounds rest on long-term 
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agreement between participants about their cooperation (including use of a wide 
range of resources) in order to hit the aims [Cheng, 1970].  
 
From our point of view the reversed is correct as well: “any contract under stage of 
its implementation forms concerned organization. Presence of parties or contractors 
and their assets in respect to proper use thereof and mutual obligations the contract is 
concluded, i.e. distribution of roles or functions between them in the course of joint 
activities then the full range of organizational signs is in place. There is only one 
thing not intrinsic in voluntary contract – quite significant length and stability of 
existence of different systems of subjects and their resources originated by it. 
Therefore we can insist that most of contracts beginning with those that concerns 
buying-selling cause appearance and liquidation of ‘virtual’ organizations” 
[Tambovtsev, 1996, с. 152]. 
 
In other words market is traditionally opposed organizations may be presented as 
aggregate of establishing and at the same moment liquidating – virtual – 
organizations acting as “links” or “channels” as perform exchange of resources 
between sustainable “bunches” of long-term contracts – i.e. firms. In this aspect 
Herbert Simon approach [Simon, 1991] suggested to talk about not market economy 
but organizational one doesn’t withdraw a contradistinction between market and 
firm. “Green spots” of firms and “red” market links between them are not only of 
different colors but also has another nature of functioning in his opinion.  
 
So if we logically follow definitions of the contract concepts it’s too hard to draw a 
bright line between market and organization, market and firm: they are corner points 
on the rather long scale covering different forms of subject and resources 
cooperation in either event oriented to meet needs of one or another consumer. 
Along with this in practice the distinctions between market economies and 
economies so called “united factory”, firm and free market are clearly drawn. It 
implies that there are thresholds, which in combination with others features reveal 
called empirically identified phenomena.  
 
In our opinion character (or structure) of a contract which performance impacts on 
interactions of economic agents may serve as such a threshold. If the similar contract 
provides for delegation of rights for signing of others contracts to one of the agents 
(the “central” agent) who can act as a representative of the others then we have 
grounds to talk about creation of organization. Such organizations where base 
contract performance oriented to value creation are economic firms. If the contract 
being under performance is enjoyed the status of legal entity in compliance with the 
rules of higher levels then a formal organization or “juridical” firm appears.  
 
Thus the “suffered” party doesn’t use a penalty if future violator’s services will gain 
more benefits versus those derived in the case of immediate application of sanctions 
(for example, in the case of initiating proceedings about bankruptcy of non-payer).  
Under such circumstances it’s clear that the choice – to wait or have recourse to the 
law – depends upon economic environment encompassed the certain incident. Here 
there are possible two basic alternatives. 
 
I. If the given economic environment is so that “suffered” party  
(a) operates in the conditions of competitive market (another partner is simply 
found), 
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(b) the court system functions under low costs and without significant 
frictions (including enforceable judgment), 
(c) assets of obligations’ breaker might be sold fast and under low costs, 
then most likely that the injured party will be inclined to break relations with 
violator and have recourse to the law. Thereby SBC are not in place under such 
environment.  
 
I. If one of the above conditions isn’t observed then likelihood to go on 
cooperation (i.e. bailing-out of breaker) most likely will be higher than recourse to 
the law. Under such circumstances when trade assets are specific and transaction 
costs are high protection of originally occasional (neo)classical contracts will tend to 
transform in long-term relational contracts presuming regular re-negotiations and re-
agreements of parties and internal mechanisms of conflicts resolution. As a result 
SBC are in place.  
 
Conducted analysis allows construct a system of SBC definitions (or interpretations) 
every thereof stresses one or another component of the given complex phenomenon. 
In our view SBC are manifested at two levels of analysis: 
 
(1) for interacting subjects as certain (time) integrity; 
(2) for certain subject (one of interacting thereof).  
Despite the level SBC can be submitted in the terms of contractual relations.  
 
In the first case SBC may be treated as a way  of behavior by way of (uncertainly) 
long-term relational contract performance process including the chain of occasional 
transactions, which prompt performance doesn’t lead to immediate sanctions to the 
breaker from the side of the sufferer. Such way  of behavior can be explained by the 
fact that net present value in the case of this contract performance is higher for the 
parties than created one after contract cancellation foreseeing compensation.  
 
In the second case for the party having obligations before the other one SBC may be 
presented as a way of behavior not envisaging measures needed these commitments 
are to be met which (measures, actions, decisions) would maximize created value; 
instead of them actions primarily oriented to value re-distribution at the expense of 
use of dominated position in the market are undertaken; for the party, which enjoys 
commitments to itself, SBC are readiness for bailing-out a potential breaker of 
prompt commitments performance proceeding from the expected benefits associated 
with going on cooperation with it; incidentally the mentioned benefits may have a 
status of merit good, newly created value or re-distributed one in favor of certain 
subject.  
 
Summarizing reflections on SBC as relational contract it is necessary to point out 
self-enforcing nature of this type of contract. As is known self-enforcement doesn’t 
presuppose involvement in relations ordering third party. Consequently, it doesn’t 
presuppose direct access to the judicial system as a part and parcel of the state. 
Generalized form of explanation of this practice is high transaction cost of access 
and usage of judicial system as a way of conflict ordering mechanisms. Some 
additional explanations of SBC as regards Russian case will be suggested in the next 
part. 
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3. Soft Budget Constraints in Russian Economy 
3.1. Forms of Soft Budget Constraints 
 
Economic environment, in which the Russian firms operate is much closer to a case 
II, than to a case I. Actually, domestic commodity markets can be characterized as 
moderate competitive [Tsukhlo, 2000], therefore costs of searching business partners 
are quite considerable, not mentioning the losses of capital at informal relations with 
partners (social capital).  
 
The work of judicial system is characterized by considerable periods of time and 
costs, the processes of executing the adjudications are also long. The comparative 
subjective estimations of Russian judicial system’s efficiency are given in [Hellman, 
Jones, Kaufmann, Schankerman, 2000, p.25-26]. Thus, there are significant costs of 
access to legal system. Obviously, economic agents seek for opportunities to order 
conflicts privately. The later provokes informal, ongoing relations, which might be 
considered in terms of relational contracts (as in previous paragraph).  
Finally, the absence of an developed securities market and impossibility to estimate 
the cost of an enterprise, may lead to the situation when the sale of in ringer’s 
property will be held at price which does not compensate losses of injured party. 
Taking these circumstances under consideration, the decision of injured to continue 
the relationship with infringers of contract obligations seems to be quite rational.  
SBC may take different forms of forgiving the infringers of obligations and their 
support when they are in a difficult situation. The most wide-spread and typical for 
Russian economy are the following forms of SBC: 
• The direct government subsidies to enterprises; 
• The indirect subsidies in the form of low fixed prices on output (first of all, 
the services of natural monopolies); 
• Federal and regional tax discounts, and duty discounts; 
• The subsidized loans, providing the guarantees for loans; 
• Overdue payments which not lead to sanctions in the form of bringing a 
bankruptcy action, including the payments for federal budget, regional and local 
budgets, to the contractors, overdue payments on wages; 
Obviously, mentioned wide spread forms is expression of political market 
performance where rules and its enforcement are exchanged for particular actions or 
non-actions. 
In the following we will make an attempt to estimate the scale and the size SBC’ 
expressions both at the level of separate industrial enterprise (with the use of data 
collected during special survey conducted by Russian Economical Barometer in 
October, 2000) and at the level of the national economy (with use of Development 
Center’s database which contains monthly series for 1993 - 2000), and then to test 
the formulated hypotheses. 
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3.2. Analysis of Nonpayments’ Dynamics in Russian Economy 
 
The characteristic of SBC as a form of relational contracts, provides the ground for 
their dynamics’ analysis on the basis of institutional market model [Tambovtsev, 
2000]. According to this model, the choice of contractual form of exchange made by 
the users can be described as coordination between seller and buyer on the market of 
differentiated product, where economic goods taken together with all their 
transactional properties play the role of objects for sale and purchase. Therefore the 
distinctions in commodities caused by their transactional properties are very similar 
to distinctions of commodities by their trademarks. 
 
Among the factors, which influence the choice of such goods (as in case of any 
market with differentiated product), there may be consumers’ preferences for various 
trademarks, prices of differentiated products, the size of budget constraint. 
For enterprises signing relational contracts (“vertically" with the state and  
employees, and “horizontally" with suppliers and consumers) about rigidity of 
requirements concerning the terms of payment, obligatory use of sanctions etc., - in 
other words, all which is included into the concept of SBC - the appropriate choice is 
determined both by a combination of positive and negative consequences of using 
SBC and size of disposable monetary resources before concluding the deal.  
Besides when analyzing SBC it is necessary to take into account the following: the 
process of learning to effectively use the appropriate contract forms does not happen 
too quickly and instantly. This process was carried out in the form of social learning 
that should explain its dynamics described by the graph, close to S-like curve.   
In fact, if we consider such parameters as deflated volumes of overdue debt for 
creditors and overdue debt of debtor accumulated by enterprises during January 1992 
- January 2000, we will find that the first of them is described by logistic equation: 
Y = 768858,5 / (1 + exp (-0,094x + 5,88))      
with R2 = 0,99, and the second one is described by logistic equation: 
Y = 436869,1 / (1 + exp (-0,083x + 5,13))      
with R2 also equal to 0,99 (here х is an ordinal number of month of 
examination). 
This mentioned circumstance makes the econometric analysis of SBC in Russian 
economy more difficult, since the construction of nonlinear regress equations does 
not tend to be an easy matter. At the same time, as these nonlinearities are in essence 
caused by process of social learning, i.e. reproduction of their business partners’ 
experience, it is possible to include trends and/or autoregressive components instead 
of logistic curves in specifying equations.  
Thus, the following system of equations can be written to explain the dynamics of 
various observable indicators of budget constraints’ softness, appropriate to their 
contract background: there should necessarily be included as the part of explaining 
variables the parameters characterizing the financial situation at enterprises, as well 
as time or value of the explained variable in the previous period of time. Besides it is 
possible to include some other variables, if there  is any substantial basis for it. 
Before providing the results of conducted calculations on the models created 
according to outlined logic, we will describe the characteristics of relationships 
between variables, which are to be treated as causal. For their analysis the Granger 
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test was used [Granger, 1967]. 
The calculations have shown that during January 1992 - April 2000 the overdue 
debts on wage with probability 0,97 created the overdue debt for creditors of the 
industrial enterprises, then the overdue debt for creditors with probability 0,99 
created the overdue debt of debtors, which, in turn, with probability 0,97 led to 
overdue debt for creditor (in other words, there was a positive feedback between the 
overdue debt for creditor and overdue debt of debtor). During the mentioned period 
of time the similar positive feedback could be observed between overdue debts of 
debtors and overdue debt for budget: the first one created the second one with 
probability 0,97, which in turn caused the first one with probability 0,94 (all 
estimations are statistically significant with 90 % probability).  
As the investigated period included two obviously non-uniform sub-period (from the 
beginning of market reforms till August 1998 crisis, and since September 1998 till 
April 2000), the similar calculations were made for each of these periods separately. 
The analysis has showed that before the crisis the overdue debtor debt caused both 
the overdue creditor debt (with probability 0, 99986) and overdue debt for budget 
(with probability 0,99987). Concerning the time after crisis there are clearly be seen 
the positive feedback between the overdue accounts payable and overdue debt on 
wage: the first one cause the second with probability 0,96, which creates the first one 
with probability 0,98. 
These described results, especially for a before crisis period, are of considerable 
interest, as they clearly illustrate the role of victims’ readiness to forgive the 
infringements of terms of payment according the signed agreements: this factor being 
one of the main for SBC was responsible for the overdue debts for creditors and 
nonpayment to budgets. At the same time, this observations does not seem to be the 
only one for explaining the dynamics of SBC’ indicators.  
Now we provide the results of conducted analysis for one SBC’ indicator — the 
overdue debt on wages. The first step is to check a hypothesis concerning the  
existence of social learning effect, i.e. concerning the adequacy of describing the 
given dynamics by equations of auto regression. 
The equation of a kind ODWt = С1 + С2ODWt-1 + εt (where ODW - overdue debt on 
wages), was evaluated for two sub-periods: 02.1994 - 08.1998, during which the 
process of social learning seemed to be the most intensive, and 08.1998 - 02.2000. 
For the  equation describing first sub-period determination coefficient turned out to 
be rather high (R2=0,997), the F-statistics is equal to 15683,03, DW = 1,54, С2 = 1,02 
with  error 0,008 and t-statistics 125,2. For the equation describing second sub-period 
R2= 0,96, F-statistics = 396,8, DW = 1,73, С2 = 1,0 with error 0,05 and t-statistics = 
19,9. 
Thereby, it is possible to consider the hypothesis about a role of social learning in 
constructing the dynamics of wage nonpayment quite confirmed. 
Multifactor regression equation appropriate to above formulated principles can be 
constructed in several variants. One of most suitable forms was the following 
specification: 
ODWt = С1 + С2NLt + С3NAt + С4ODWt-1 + С5ODBt + εt,    
where NL – net liquidity ratio, NA – net assets of industrial enterprises, ODB - 
overdue debt for budget. All the coefficients (except for С1) are statistically 
significant, besides С2 and С3 are negative, and С4 and С5 are more zero. R2 is equal 
0,99, F-statistics = 4551,9, DW = 1,52. What is especially remarkable here is the sign 
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at ODW: it is the evidence of the fact that accumulation of debts on wages and for 
budget is not considered to be alternatives for enterprises. Generally according to the 
above equation, debts on wages as the measure of the given component of budget 
constraint’s softness is explained by deficit of own monetary resources (liquidity) of 
enterprises, and experience of “unrisky” (imprudent) behavior accumulated by 
managers of enterprises. 
All these results correspond with conclusions made in investigations by 
R.I.Kapelyushnikov [Kapelyushnikov, 2000], according to which managers 
consciously regulate the scale and duration of wage delays, keeping them on a 
sufficient distance from those borders, behind which they expect serious social 
conflicts at their enterprises to occur. From the managers’ point of view, actual credit 
from employees could be covered at the expense of bank credits only if that interest 
rate would be negative! Thereby, for enterprises wage delays and its nonpayment are 
the results of rational decisions which take into account managers’ expectations 
concerning the “bailing-out” behavior by managers’ “victims”. There is also another 
interesting fact stating that competition pressure does not effect managers’ behavior. 
This fact underlines the peculiarities of competition between enterprises, that is the 
availability of soft budget constraints in dimension «employer - employee». 
The dynamics of SBC’ indicators as the overdue debts for creditors of industrial 
enterprises, overdue debt of debtors, overdue debt for budget is described by  similar 
equations with close values of statistical criteria concerning the quality of received 
parameters. 
 
 
3.3. Analysis of Soft Budget Constraints’ Factors at a Level of Industrial 
Enterprise 
 
If taking into account the above mentioned facts about relationship between the 
degree of  hardness (softness) of budget constraints, market competition, the degree 
of SBC’ influence on restructuring processes, it is possible to point out that if SBC 
contract model is correct and the model of institutional market is adequate to real 
situations of making the strategic decisions at enterprises, the main alternatives 
between which such choice is being made, are characterized as follows: 
(1) competitive market – hard budget constraints - restructuring the enterprise - 
effective usage of resources 
(2) noncompetitive market (domination on the market) - soft budget constraints 
- absence of restructuring - inefficient usage of resources 
Let's now consider the outlined variants in more details. If the market where the 
enterprise operate is highly competitive, then it can not broadly and regularly use 
cost-plus  pricing for softening its budget constraints (that is to compensate all actual 
costs by the price). The appropriate opportunities arise when the enterprise enters the 
market with new product range, becoming a (temporary) leader that allows it to make 
the price. It is possible to use this mode regularly only if such firm regularly makes 
restructuring (re-engineering), ensuring there will be a constant efficiency raise in 
using the resource potential of firm. 
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On the contrary, a stable dominant position enables firm to regularly apply cost-plus 
pricing to cover costs caused by the kinds of decisions about resources’ usage. Thereby, 
the incentives to making restructuring are becoming weaker. Hence, the steps creating the 
ground for dominant market position of some enterprises (which in turn helps such 
enterprises to survive) at the same time lead to efficiency decrease of resources usage in 
the economy.  
The provided basis for the above mentioned forms of enterprises’ behavior are still 
the hypotheses, which we have examined on materials of the Russian industrial 
enterprises’ survey. The survey has covered 177 industrial enterprises, which 
distributed by industries as follows: machine-building - 27,1 % of the respondents, 
metallurgy - 4,5 %, electric power industry - 0,6 %, chemistry and oil-chemistry - 7,9 
%, light industry 14,1 %, food-processing industry 14,1 %, industry of building 
materials 9,0 %, wood manufacturing and cellulose and paper industry 11,9 %, fuel 
industry 1,1 %, other industries 6,8 %. 
We then describe general distributions of given answers to the questions. 18,6 % of 
the whole quantity of answered to the question about frequency of partners’ 
changing, answered that they changed their partners quite frequently, 48,6 % of the 
answered said they changed the partners occasionally, 32,2 % - almost did not 
change. In other words, a majority of respondents (more than 80 %) are the 
participants of more or less stable business groups. 
4,5% of the answered regularly received some economic support from regional 
authorities, 22,6% received it from time to time, and 72,3% - nearly never. What is 
essential is that the produced figures are a bit lower than the mentioned above results 
of survey conducted by Russian Economic Barometer, according to which about 
40% of enterprises received some kind of support from federal and regional 
authorities. 
2,8% of the enterprises regularly received some economic support from partners, 
29,4% received it from time to time, 66,7% - almost never. 
29,4% of the enterprises are expecting tax authorities not to apply rigid sanctions for 
delays in paying federal taxes for the term of no more than month  
37,3% - for no more than 3 months  
Total - 66,7 %   
9,6 % - for no more half-year   
6,8 % - for no more than 1 year  
8,5% - for up to 1,5 years. 
24,9% of the enterprises are expecting tax authorities not to apply rigid 
sanctions for delay of payment the regional taxes for the term of no more than a 
month   
36,7% - for no more than 3 months 
Total - 61,6 %   
14,7% - for no more half year 
7,9% - for no more than 1 year 
6,2% - for up to 1,5 years. 
41,2% of the enterprises are expecting their bank not to apply rigid sanctions 
for delay with paying the back the credit for the term of no more than a month 
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22,0% - for no more than 3 months 
Total - 63,2 %   
9,6% - for no more half-year 
4,5% - for no more than 1 year 
1,7% - for up to 1,5 years. 
20,9% of the enterprises are expecting their supplier not to apply rigid 
sanctions for delay of paying for received materials, raw material, etc. for the term of 
no more than month  
42,9% - for no more than 3 months 
Total - 63,8 %   
19,8% - for no more half-year 
4,5% - for no more than 1 year 
4,0% - up to 1,5 years. 
The comparison of these distributions of expectations allows to make a conclusion of 
them being very close for all types of the contractors if we make an assumption that 
the delay of payment for no more than a month and for no more than 3 months (that 
is the allowable term for delay when fulfilling the obligation under the Civil Code of 
Russian Federation) are being within the same interval. If that assumption is 
accepted, then most “soft” partners will appear to be tax authorities on regional 
component of taxes, and most “rigid” - again tax authorities but on federal 
component of taxes. However if taking the structure of the mentioned three-month 
period of time into consideration, the most “rigid” partners will be the banks, as a 
share of enterprises expecting the sanctions come up already after 1 month of delay 
is higher than any other share. On the whole the received distributions are close to 
expected ones. 
2,8% of the enterprises have estimated the domestic market of their production as the 
highest competitive, 5,15 – highly competitive, 42,9% - moderately competitive, 
35,6% - low competitive, 8,55 - actually uncompetitive (5,1% - did not answer the 
question). Thus, the overwhelming majority of enterprises consider the markets of 
their products as average and low competitive; and such conclusion is correlated with 
the data published by S. Tsukhlo [Tsukhlo, 2000]. 
9,0% of participants have evaluated the world market of their products as the highest 
competitive, 8,5% - highly competitive, 14,1% - moderately competitive, 14,1% - 
low competitive, 14,7% - actually uncompetitive (39,5% did not answer the 
question). 
 
On the question about a situation with restructuring of the enterprises the following 
answers were received: 
The restructuring  has recently been conducted or is being conducted now - 
28,2%; 
The restructuring will be conducted in the near future - 8,5%; 
The restructuring is possible in the long term  - 15,8%; 
The restructuring is desirable, but there are no possibilities for it - 29,4%; 
There is no need in restructuring - 15,8%. 
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In other words, about 30% of the enterprises have been restructured or are being 
restructured (we will call such undertakings as restructured ones), 25% consider the 
restructuring potentially possible, and for about 30% it is desirable, but impossible 
for one reason or another, 15% does not find it necessary. 
Having provided the general characteristic of answers to the questionnaire we 
proceed with the analysis of relationships between them, i.e. try to check up the 
hypotheses formulated above.  
First of all, we shall describe the pair relations in the form of correlation between 
distributions of the received answers. Since the majority of examined variables are 
measured in ordinal scale, there may be used Spearman and Pearson correlation 
coefficients which were calculated with the use of the data. It is necessary to note, 
that as a whole number of statistically significant coefficients (at level 0,01 or 0,05) 
is not considerable, and their absolute values, as a rule, are lower than 0,5. The rather 
high values of the mentioned coefficients (larger than 0,5) take place for those 
variables, which are close to them by sense. 
The degree of belonging to business groups (Pearson coefficient is equal 0, 212 with 
significance 0,01) is negatively correlated with the frequency of using cash payments 
for supply that corresponds to the assumption about the informal character of such 
groups. At the same time the significant relationships between participation in 
business group and the level of support from business partners has no been revealed. 
There also has not been found any statistically significant correlation between 
variables measured in ordinal scales, and such parameters as support from regional 
authorities and support from business partners.  
The statistically significant correlation has been revealed between level of market 
competition and the softness of budget constraints: Pearson correlation coefficient 
between level of budget constraints’ softness (on the federal taxes’ component) and 
the level of domestic competition was equal to 0,164 with significance 0,05; between 
budget constraints’ softness (on the regional taxes’ component) and the level of 
domestic competition was equal to 0,193 (with significance 0,01); between budget 
constraints’ softness (on supply payments)and the level of domestic competition  was 
equal to 0,249 (with significance 0,01).5 The appropriate Spearman correlation 
coefficients are equal to 0,193, 0,182 and 0,154 with significance 0,05. In other 
words, if making conclusions from provided estimations, it will be correct to state 
that the enterprises operating in more competitive environment tend to expect softer 
attitude to them from business partners in the case of payments’ delays. Though the 
pointed relations are rather weak, they obviously do not correspond to the hypotheses 
formulated at the beginning of the section. Therefore it is necessary to examine the 
revealed situation in detail using others variables measured within the framework of 
analyzed data. 
One of the possible explanations may be the fact that regional authorities which 
determine the rigidity of their attitude towards the tax non-payers, consider a higher 
level of competition as the cause of necessity to support and protect tax non-payer 
against “excessive” competition from “strangers".  
Similarly one can explain the softness of suppliers’ position, taking into account the 
fact that the majority of respondents are the participants of more or less stable 
business groups. In these conditions greater partners’ softness towards the 
                                                 
5 The statistically significant correlation with world competition has not been revealed. 
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obligations’ violators which operate in highly competitive environment, can be the 
main form of support inside business groups which have been revealed as an answer 
to direct question about intensity of similar support (among the prompts to this 
question has not been mentioned such factor as the possibility of a partial forgiving 
the payment terms’ infringement; probably, this circumstance caused the appearance 
of the mentioned above paradox conclusion concerning absence of correlation 
between a degree of participation in business groups and level of support from 
business partners). 
Concerning the relationship between softness of regional authorities’ attitude towards 
tax payment and rigidity of competition pressure on an enterprise, the formulated 
assumption and hypothesis are confirmed by the results of the special regional tax 
incentives examination made in [Kolomak, 2000, with. 33-34]. 
 
Thus, our hypothesis about correlation between level of competition and hard budget 
constraints has to be corrected for regional authorities’ position. The last one, if 
implementing a protectionist policy concerning the enterprises whose poor financial 
situation can be explained by competition pressure (and not at all, for example, by 
unwillingness to restructure) make the appropriate budget constraints softer. Hence, 
the initial hypothesis should be supplemented by the condition of regional 
authorities’ neutrality to financial situation at local enterprises, but this condition in 
practice does not often work [Desai, Goldberg, 2000]. 
 
We then proceed to analysis of pair relations between the factors measured in 
different, not only in ordinal scales. The correlation analysis here can not be used, 
therefore tables of cross distributions of examined variables will serve as the main 
toolkit for the analysis. 
 
10% of the restructured enterprises estimate their product competitiveness on 
domestic market as high and very high, 62% - as average, 28% - as low, 0% - as very 
low. 8,6% of the no restructured enterprises evaluate their product competitiveness 
on domestic market as high and very high, 57% - as average, 26% - as low, 9% - as 
very low. 38% of the restructured enterprises evaluate their product competitiveness 
on world market as high and very high, 20% - as average, 8% - as low, 0% - as very 
low (34% did nor answer the question). 29% of the no restructured enterprises 
evaluate their product competitiveness on world market as high and very high, 21% - 
as average, 9% - as low, 4% - as very low (36% did nor answer the question). 
Therefore, there are some differences in estimations of product competitiveness 
given by restructured and no restructured enterprises. But the more positive answers 
to this question are given by restructured enterprises. At the same time, the 
mentioned differences can not be considered substantial. 
4% of the restructured enterprises consider the domestic market as highly and highest  
competitive, 52% - as moderate competitive, 34% - as low competitive, 2% - as very 
low competitive. 9% of the no restructured enterprises evaluate the domestic market 
as highly and highest competitive, 39% - as moderate competitive, 36% - as low 
competitive, 11% - as very low competitive. In this case there are some significant 
differences: among no restructured enterprises the share of those which work in 
highly competitive environment, is twice higher than share for similar kind of 
restructured enterprises (average share on sample is 8,1 %). Hence, it is possible to 
assume, that the restructuring while increase product competitiveness, also improves 
competitive market position of enterprises and makes this enterprise one of leaders of 
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the appropriate market.  
 
To examine this hypothesis we will make a comparison between the data on 
restructured enterprises and those enterprises which would like to restructure but 
have no opportunities. This choice of data for comparison is explained by the 
following: an incentive to restructuring may be provided by high competition (that is 
if these enterprises were in competitive environment). So, in the chosen group of 
enterprises 13% of the answered to the question consider domestic market as high 
and highest competitive, 46% - as moderate competitive, 25% - as low competitive, 
10% - as very low competitive. It is easy to see that the indicated data confirm the 
formulated hypothesis. 
 
Let's now consider the relationship between level of domestic market competition 
and degree of regional authorities’ support. 37,5% of the enterprises which regularly 
has had such support consider domestic market as low competitive, 50,0% say that 
this market is moderate competitive and 0% say that domestic market is highly 
competitive (12,5% did not answer this question). 50% of the enterprises which had 
the mentioned support only occasionally, consider domestic market as low 
competitive and very low competitive, 40% - moderate competitive and 7,5% - 
highly and highest competitive (2,5% did not answer). 43% of the enterprises which 
almost never had support from regional authorities have underlined that domestic 
market is low competitive, 43% said the it is moderate competitive, and 8,5 % - 
highly competitive (5,5% of respondents did not answer the question).  
Therefore we may conclude that the higher the regularity of support from regional 
authorities, the higher the probability of these enterprises having the dominant 
position on domestic (or local) market and the less competitive market is. When 
making a comparison between the provided data and the conclusions made on the 
basis of correlation analysis, one may find some formal discrepancy between them. 
However this discrepancy is only real as we analyze two different forms of support. 
Above we have mentioned a positive correlation between informal tax discounts 
(actual long term bailing-out tax nonpayers) and competition level for an enterprises, 
we now examine a direct support of enterprises positively correlated with the role of 
the enterprise for region and its dominant position.  
Thereby, regional authorities tend to help both competition leaders and outsiders. It 
is quite possible that by the similar reason of such support (positive short and 
intermediate term externalities of regional level) the motives for support may be 
different. The dominant enterprises are supported by credits and investments which 
helps further to develop and strengthen their market position, but outsiders 
(functioning in the high competitive environment) are supported by informal tax 
discounts, since the refusal of their support will cause negative social consequences 
(growth of unemployment) and will not help to full the regional budget. It is quite 
obvious that the analysis of motives for regional authorities’ actions can not be 
conducted on data of this research and requires the data of another (sociological) 
character. 
What is the relationship between competition level and enterprises’ support from 
business partners? 20% of the enterprises which regularly had such support from 
business partners point out to low competition, 60% say that domestic market is 
moderate competitive and 20% say that it is highly competitive. 42% of the 
enterprises which occasionally had support from business partners have underlined 
that domestic market is low competitive, 50% said the it is moderate competitive, 
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and 6% - highly competitive. 46% of the enterprises which almost never had support 
from business partners have considered domestic market as low competitive, 39% 
said the it is moderate competitive, and 8% - highly competitive. In other words, the 
enterprises which has constant support from business partners estimate their markets 
as highly competitive opposite to those which does not have any support: the lower 
the regularity of enterprises’ support from business partners, the higher the 
probability of them having dominant position on the market. Hence the relationships 
between the level of support from business partners and competition level are 
opposite to the relationships between competition level and the level of support from 
regional authorities.  
 
The data allow to make an assumption that the estimation of competition level 
provided by sellers which belong to different groups (both which have and does not 
have any support) is asymmetric and depends on enterprise’s market position. But 
the latter turns out to be connected with softness of budget constraints caused by 
“bailing-out” behavior of authorities, employees and contractors. 
 
What  are the relationship between level of domestic competition and a quantity of 
employees at an enterprise? According to data in Table 1, the majority in each group 
of enterprises operates in average competitive environment, the high and low 
competitive markets are a matter of small, average and big enterprises in 
approximately equal degree, but only small enterprises operate in highest competitive 
environment.  
On our opinion, such correlation provides enough explanations to low levels of 
correlation between all variables examined above: small enterprises in Russian 
Federation actually never get any preferences, subsidies etc., despite the variety of 
programs on their support. Some their business partners are able to soften budget 
constraints for small enterprises  partners on (informal) business groups, as confirm 
above mentioned results of the analysis. 
 
Table 1.  
Relationship between size of an enterprise and level of a competitiveness 
on a home market* 
 Staff number, person 
Competition level Up to 200 201 - 500 501 – 1000 Above 1000 
No answer 2 / 3% 4 / 8,6% 2 / 6,8% 1 / 3,2% 
Very low 7 / 10,7% 4 / 8,6% 2 / 6,8% 2 / 6,4% 
Low 20 / 30,7% 17 / 36,9% 10 / 34,5% 13 / 41,9% 
Moderate 26 / 40% 20 / 43,5% 13 / 44,8% 14 / 45,2% 
High 5 / 7,6% 1 / 2% 2 / 6,8% 1 / 3,2% 
Highest 5 / 7,6% 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 
Total 65 / 100% 46 / 100% 29 / 100% 31 / 100% 
* Number of respondents/part of respondents by column 
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Since the overwhelming majority of the enterprises are sure they operate in 
environment with moderate and low competition, the hypothesis formulated at the 
beginning of the section should be true, if it reflects the following logic chain: 
Dominant market position - soft budget constraints - absence of restructuring - 
inefficient use of resources. 
The given data confirm the existence of such logic chain in Russian economy.  
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4. Conclusions: Detailed policy implications 
 
1. The soft budget constraints are the phenomenon typical not only for centralized but for 
transitional and even developed market economies as well.  It is not connected to the 
particular features of purposes of organized (state) ideology. The comprehension of the matter 
and peculiarities of soft budget constraints in specific economy requires detailed analysis of 
contract relations functioning in it. The soft budget constraints greatly and systematically 
influence the stimulus structure of economic agents and their economic behavior and through 
stimulus and behavior. Further, soft budget constraints influence the effectiveness of scarce 
resources usage. 
 
2. The conducted theoretical and empirical analysis of relation between the domination of the 
economic agents on the market and softness of the budget constraints grounds the discussion 
on its real presence in Russian economy and, finally, on its negative influence on general 
efficiency of resource usage, dragging the economic growth in Russia due to distortion of 
stimulus of economic agents. The prevalence of average and low evaluations of competition 
degree on most of domestic markets witnesses the wide opportunities for enterprises to use 
the possessed resources not effectively without facing the threat of bankruptcy or liquidation. 
 
3.  The mentioned evaluations of competition degree, confirmed by the data from the other 
sources, are associated with presence of high barriers to entry to and exit from market as well 
as with wide development of network forms of industry organization in Russian economy. 
The network forms of organization of any national economy influence the efficiency of 
resources use contradictorily. In Russian economy during the post-crisis period, when the 
participation of imported goods in creation of competitive environment decreased, the 
negative influence of network form of industry organization becomes more perceptible. 
 
4. The soft budget constraints exist in different dimensions and are conditioned by various 
factors. The most important dimensions are the relations “enterprise-state”, “enterprise-
enterprise”, “enterprise-employees”. The forms of soft budget constraints include the 
provision of non-repayable subsides, the repayment of debts of economic agents at the 
expense of state financial resources, delay or write-off of tax arrears, reduced tariffs, 
provision of real estate units on the preferential terms, refusal of the creditor (other enterprise) 
to initiate the bankruptcy procedure in the presence of bad debts. Simultaneously the 
mentioned factors are the basis for worsening the competition conditions on the markets. 
From this point of view, the creation of the conditions for effective competition is, finally, the 
hardening of budget constraints. 
The long-term strategy of the government regarding the soft budget constraints should 
consecutively harden these constraints to such an extent as it forms incentives as well as 
actions of economic agents aimed on search for new technologies of production of well-
known goods, new goods production, restructuring increasing the effectiveness of production, 
search for new markets and resources. 
 
5. According to the model by J.Che and observations given above on positive influence of 
non-payments (as the form of soft budget constraints) on Russian economic dynamics, the 
simultaneous hardening of the competition conditions (which is equivalent to the hardening of 
budget constraints of the enterprises) can cause large scale negative consequences, obviously 
exceeding the positive effects from such measures in the form of increase of effectiveness of 
resource use by the enterprises survived after adoption of measures mentioned above. 
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Strictly speaking, the positive effects can exceed the negative ones only in case if in spite of 
preconditions of the model by J.Che the output of the “good” enterprises can be increased pro 
rata, thus compensating the reduction of the output caused by the liquidation of “bad” 
enterprises. Such redistribution of total output (and its farther growth) simply means 
“materialization” of the investments into successfully functioning enterprises, increase of 
workplaces on these enterprises, overflow of the employees to restructured, reconstructed and 
new built enterprises. The obstacles to such scenario in the domestic economy obviously are 
the mentioned above high entry and exit market barriers as well as low activity of investment 
process caused by both low level of savings and non-secured property rights, sharply 
decreasing stimulus for internal investments. 
 
6. Choosing of the degree of softness of budget constraints one should take into consideration 
the necessity to find under certain conditions the compromise between negative externalities 
caused by use of sanctions (especially to large market agents) as the demonstration of 
simultaneous harshness of the budget constraints and moral hazard expressed in lack or 
absence of incentives as well as in elaboration and application of effective procedures of 
preliminary assessment of investment projects, reliability of trade contractors etc. as 
consequences of soft budget constraints. Thereupon the simultaneous equalization of 
competition conditions in view of harshness of the budget constraints can contradict the 
criteria of dynamic efficiency. The adoption of simultaneous large scale measures on 
hardening the budget constraints in all directions is not recommended. The basis is the real 
parity of forcing state power and ability of economic agents to support the existing economic 
practices, the essential of which is soft budget constraints. 
Soft budget constraints possess the property of cumulativeness caused by the actions of the 
state as an ultimate enforcer of obligations. The attempt to harden the constraints in the 
relations between enterprises at the simultaneous preservation of the practice of state 
assurance of cover for losses has little chance of success.  
 
7. Certain softening of the budget constraints of the enterprises causes not only negative but 
also positive effect on the development of economic processes and effectiveness of resource 
use. In this context the question is especially important which non-radical measures lead to 
the consecutive hardening of the budget constraints when the total positive consequences 
prevail over negative ones. 
From our point of view, the condition distinguishing the “positive” and “negative” reflections 
of soft budget constraints, which require correspondingly the passive attitude and active 
counteraction from the side of public authorities, is the sign of balance of all accounted 
consequences of each reflection of this kind. 
Conducting the assessment of this sign, it is necessary to proceed from the assumptions, 
which can be formulated in form of the principle of reasonable completeness of the 
accounting of consequences of each specific expression of soft budget constraints. The 
essence of this principle is in the fact that the expenses of the public authorities (or other 
assessment agent) on data collection and realization of conclusive calculations should be 
certainly lower then expected benefits for economy (and state budget) from preclusion 
(elimination) of the analyzed expression of soft budget constraints. 
 
8. The consecutive application of the principle of reasonable completeness of consequences 
accounting is not identical to the situation when frequently public authorities on different 
levels virtually remit tax arrears selectively for certain enterprises (through “automatic” 
restructuring) etc, not extending such eases on other enterprises. Due to non-transparency of 
the reasons of such practices there are not enough arguments to judge on the sign of 
mentioned positive and negative consequences of softening of budget constraints. 
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Therefore it is necessary to supplement the formulation of the principle of reasonable 
completeness of the accounting of consequences of each specific reflection of soft budget 
constraints with the list of minimum set of factors, which should be taken into consideration 
while making the corresponding “softening” decision on standard situations of emerging of 
soft budget constraints. 
 
8.1. Among such factors first of all is the situation at the local labor market as because of 
rather low mobility of the RF population (conditioned by low level of real income, 
undeveloped accommodation market, and even sometimes - by the direct institutional barriers 
for mobility), labor-saving restructuring, bankruptcy or liquidation as a result of disability of 
the enterprise, occupying monopoly position in this or that settlement, will bring to the more 
unfavorable consequences both for regional and federal organs of government.  
Even if the pay-out amounts for the temporary released employees will be lower than 
subventions and benefits amounts, needed for enterprise support, its liquidation could bring to 
liquidation of different fragments of social infrastructure in the settlement and, by that, to the 
significant negative social consequences at the regional level. As far as just these conclusions 
are the main factual basements for origination the soft budget constraints, it is important to 
take into consideration the existence of transparent rules, procedures, regulating state 
performance in frame of legislation on social security of population. Acting legislation 
contains rules, regulating ways of delineated problem solution. However, the practice of mass 
preventing of hardening of budget constraints from the side of regional and local government 
bodies clearly indicate the non-sufficient effectiveness of such rules. Consequently, its further 
development and improvement, from one side, and increase of efficiency of mechanisms, 
providing its validity, - from the other. 
  
8.2. The next important issue is connected to the following: if the enterprise is a local 
monopolist on production of non-moving commodities and services, how large the 
transportation costs, which could arise in case its production will be replaced by the 
production of another suppliers. If the state of the enterprise is monopoly, the concrete subject 
of analyses is a comparison of the volumes of subsidizes and preferences, which should be 
provided for the potential bankrupt to perform, with the volume of subsidies to the new 
supplier to compensate its transport costs so as the price-level formed in this area not undergo 
a considerable shock.   
 
8.3. A significant factor of decision-making on hardening of budget constraints is the strategic 
importance of goods produced by enterprises. If such a production is produced by non-state 
enterprise and there is unsatisfactory financial situation for rather long time, at first glance the 
rational strategy is nationalization of such enterprise in a way it is to be organizational-legal 
form of an official enterprise. However, such a scenario of events could be followed by the 
created by them opportunities for the unfair behavior of the enterprise management, hoping 
for maintaining its duty positions after the transformation mentioned above and being able 
consciously to work for deterioration of the financial conditions of the enterprise for solving 
personal problems. To prevent such situations it is necessarily to envisage obligatory change 
of management of such enterprises. If the strategically important production is produced by 
the state enterprise the changing its form to public one should be coupled by change of 
management too. Significant reserves of state-owed enterprise management improvement are 
connected as well with improvement of labor contacts, signed between the state and the 
government of an enterprise. 
 
9. An important measure, which could (in case of its sequence performance) to withstand the 
creation of negative consequences of soft budget constraints, connected to managers' 
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behavior, not undertake measures of caution against danger of timely failure to perform its 
duties by the enterprise, will be more widely spread of the norm of full responsibility for the 
enterprises and substation hardening of registration rules of companies with limited liability. 
It is worth to mention the experience of Germany, where the newly created enterprises are 
getting the form of the company with full responsibility of its founders, and just after rather 
long successful functioning under such legal framework they could be transferred into the 
form of public corporation. On realization of such type of measures there is improve in owner 
responsibility on managers selection, and control on managers actions are shifting into the 
sphere of owners special concern.  
 
10. Aiming non-admission of odd negative externalities it is critically important to tighten 
step by step enterprise functioning conditions, which could coordinate expectations of 
managers and owners of enterprises, from one side, and provide with time, needed for 
learning by doing or imitation or another form of adaptation, from the other. With this aim the 
formulation of measures, directed towards de-regulation of the economy, should take into 
account the necessity to search for compromise between costs of adaptation to changing 
conditions and reliability of promises concerning use of sanctions towards those who have 
chosen status-quo strategy.  
 
11. The condition of negative effects minimization there are transparence of decisions making 
by state structures concerning all forms of support of enterprises as well as accurate definition 
of borders in frame of which such a support could be conducted. In other words, the so called 
"codification" of forms of budget constraints softening, that is formation and approval by the 
Government (or by the Federal Assembly in form of law), systems of rules, which will 
connect all the peculiarities of difficult financial situation, in which the enterprise is, and 
causes of such situation, with admissible forms and scales of support of the enterprise from 
the side of federal and regional bodies of power and management (Decree of the Government 
of Russian Federation "On improvement of forms of economic bodies" with sequential 
enactment of  the federal law "On state support". 
Introduction of such rules, from one side, will not lead to the sharp hardening of budget 
constraints and, consequently, to large-scale negative consequences, and, from the other side, 
by improving the level of certainty of future for enterprises, will let them use their resources 
more rational. Inclusion to the roles, mentioned above the time dimension (for instance in 
such form that within a year this or that support could be provided not more than 2-3 times or 
in a form of long-term, during which any preference and so on could be used) in connection 
with square changes of these rules as the economic situation will permit, from our point of 
view, to provide the necessarily step-by-step in hardening of budget constraints  
 
12. Selective support of some enterprises on non-transparent basis is not just one of the 
motive for creation the corruption relations, but it generates a special type of administrative 
barriers for enter the market and outlet from it.  
As the support resources, which are at the dispose of the government bodies of different level, 
especially regional and local ones, are rather limited, the support, given to some enterprises 
could not be given to another. So compared to the first ones there is some barrier of 
administrative character in front of the last ones, preventing the admission to those markets, 
where the supported enterprises operate.  
On the contrary for supported enterprises the barrier for step out the market is created as in 
exchange for support they have to necessitate to operate even in case it is economically 
unjustified.  
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13. The main problem is that in what way to incentive the enterprise to restructurization 
aiming to advance the efficiency of corporate management, under conservation at the moment 
the soft budget constraints. In this case it is useful to differ the system of assure of enterprises 
ad hoc and secular. The first case does not assume imminent building of expectations, 
provoking unfair behavior of managers, borrowers, if there is real threat to use sanctions in 
case the breach continues.  Among the credible threats - is the limitation of opportunities of 
regional authorities selectively interfere to the enterprise performance, increase in 
transparency of the companies due to implementation of reporting system, applicable to 
modern standards, working out and use of the procedures of change of debts to stocks, 
development of market infrastructure of outer control (auditors' market, rating agencies 
services). 
 
For prevention the relapse of softening the budget constraints it is necessarily to solve the 
problem of division of perspective economic organization from the not-perspective, liable to 
liquidation.  
 
The choice of the regime of hardening of budget constraints is dependant on ways of 
overcoming by the initiators the counteraction from the groups of special interests and costs 
of realization and estimation of results of used measures, such as freezing of investment 
projects, dismissing of overabundant labor force, sale of affiliations, sale of company assets, 
cut and change of management staff.  
 
14. Last but not least conclusion is connected with the International Financial Organizations 
(IFO) such as WB and IMF activity. These organizations are characterized, as it is easy to see, 
by all properties belonging to the “sufferers” in the SBC-contracting: valuability of social 
aspects (as in Che model), managers’ entrenchment (as in Mitchell model) and so on. 
Implementing model of SBC developed above to this subject one can maintain that practice of 
the countries debts bailing-out will be eliminated only under one of the following conditions: 
 
• Introducing of competition among IFO via increase the amount of its; 
• Introducing for IFO options to invest not only in state’s debts but and in other 
directions too. 
 
At the same time, in the light of Che model, there are some doubts about the hardening of 
SBC existing in the relations between IFO and the developing countries. As it seems to as, the 
principles discussed in the points 7 – 13 given above are quite applicable mutatis mutandis to 
the IFO–countries interactions. 
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